The acquisition and evolution of speech production, discourse and communication can be negatively impacted by brain malformations. We describe, for the first time, a case of developmental dynamic dysphasia (DDD) in a right-handed adolescent boy (subject D) with cortical malformations involving language-eloquent regions (inferior frontal gyrus) in both the left and the right hemispheres. Language evaluation revealed a markedly reduced verbal output affecting phonemic and semantic fluency, phrase and sentence generation and verbal communication in everyday life. Auditory comprehension, repetition, naming, (...) reading and spelling were relatively preserved, but executive function was impaired. Multimodal neuroimaging showed a malformed cerebral cortex with atypical configuration and placement of white matter tracts bilaterally and abnormal callosal fibers. Dichotic listening showed right hemisphere dominance for language and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) additionally revealed dissociated hemispheric language representation with right frontal activation for phonology and bilateral dominance for semantic processing. Moreover, subject D also had congenital mirror movements (CMM), defined as involuntary movements of one side of the body that mirror intentional movements of the other side. Transcranial magnetic stimulation and fMRI during voluntary unimanual (left and right) hand movements showed bilateral motor cortex recruitment and tractography revealed a lack of decussation of bilateral corticospinal tracts. Genetic testing aimed to detect mutations that disrupt the development of commissural tracts correlating with CMM (e.g., Germline DCC mutations) was negative. Overall, our findings suggest that DDD in subject D resulted from the underdevelopment of the left inferior frontal gyrus with limited capacity for plastic reorganization by its homologous counterpart in the right hemisphere. Corpus callosum anomalies probably contributed to hinder interhemispheric connectivity necessary to compensate language and communication deficits after left frontal involvement. (shrink)

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v25-fernandez.

RESUMEN: La teoría causal formulada por Kripke y Putnam es la teoría semántica dominante de los términos de género natural y, en especial, de los términos de sustancia. La teoría semántica de los términos de sustancia de Locke ha sido, supuestamente, refutada por aquélla. Según Putnam, la teoría de Locke ha pasado por alto dos importantes contribuciones a la semántica, y principalmente a la referencia, de los términos de sustancia, a saber, la contribución de la sociedad y la del entorno. (...) El objetivo de este artículo es argüir que la teoría de Locke puede incorporar la primera contribución y que alguien que en principio sostuviese una teoría como la de Locke podría verse llevado a aceptar también la segunda contribución.ABSTRACT: The causal theory put forward by Kripke and Putnam is the dominant semantic theory of natural kind terms and especially of substance terms. Locke’s semantic theory of substance terms has supposedly been rebutted by it. Locke’s theory has, according to Putnam, overlooked two significant contributions to the semantics, and mainly to the reference, of substance terms, namely, the contribution of the society and that of the environment. This paper aims to argue that Locke’s theory is able to embrace the first contribution and that someone who initially held a theory like Locke’s could be led to accept also the second one. (shrink)

This paper aims to propose a version of the description theory of reference –for short, descriptivism– on natural kind terms. This version is grounded on some proposals of descriptivists, such as Searle and Strawson, about proper names, which will be extended to natural kind terms. According to Searle and Strawson the reference of a proper name is determined by a sufficient number of the descriptions that speakers associate with the name, but among the sorts of descriptions admitted by these authors (...) are those in which the average speaker defers the reference of a term to other speakers. In this regard, descriptivism can accept Putnam’s thesis of the division of linguistic labour and claim that some of the descriptions associated by non-experts have the function of deferring the reference of natural kind terms to their reference in the use by experts. Thus, descriptivism can maintain that the reference of a natural kind term is determined by a sufficient number of the descriptions that experts concerning a natural kind associate with the term. I will argue that this version of descriptivism, which grants more weight to social links than to historical links, can explain better than Kripke’s theory the reference of the use of natural kind terms by the average speaker. (shrink)

Tarski's theory of truth brings out the question of whether he intended his theory to be a correspondence theory of truth and whether, whatever his intentions, his theory is in fact a correspondence theory. The aim of this paper is to answer both questions. The answer to the first question depends on Tarski's relevant assertions on semantics and his conception of truth. In order to answer the second question Popper's and Davidson's interpretations of Tarski's truth theory are examined; to this (...) end both Tarski's definition of truth in terms of satisfaction and the T-sentences are taken into account. (shrink)

The articles in this collection focus on philosophical approaches to proper names. The issues discussed include abstract names, empty names, naming and name-using practices, definite descriptions, individuals, reference, designation, sense and semantics. The contributions show the importance and lasting influence of theories proposed by John Stuart Mill, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Donald Davidson, and Saul Kripke. Individual chapters assess traditional analyses and modern controversies, and contribute to the debate on proper names in contemporary philosophy of language.

Kripke holds the thesis that identity statements containing natural kind terms are if true, necessarily true; these statements can be denominated theoretical identities. Kripke alleges that the necessity of theoretical identities grounds on the linguistic feature that natural kind terms are rigid designators. Nevertheless, I argue that the conception of natural kind terms as rigid designators, in one of their most natural views, hinders the establishment of the truth of theoretical identities and thus of their necessity. However, in Kripke’s works (...) another proposal, not linguistic but metaphysical, is found to justify the presumed necessity of theoretical identities; it grounds on essentialism concerning natural kinds. In this regard, I question some of Kripke’s main claims, focusing on one of the main examples of theoretical identities put forward by Kripke, i.e., “Water is H2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$_2$$\end{document}O”. I challenge his a priori claims concerning what should be the essence of a natural kind like water. Furthermore, I adduce that the character of that theoretical identity is not that claimed by Kripke, since in the term flanking the right side of the identity sign it has to be resorted to the notion of similarity or it should have the form of a disjunction of a cluster of substances. (shrink)

La argumentación de Frege contra la definibilidad de la verdad pretende mostrar que una definición de verdad es circular o nos involucra en un regreso al infinito. En la obra de Frege cabe distinguir dos nociones de verdad: la verdad expresada mediante el termine “verdadero” y la verdad expresada mediante la aserción. La argumentación de Frege no muestra que el términe “verdadero” sea indefinible, pero, si se acepta la concepción de Frege acerca de la aserción, de su argumentación, adecuadamente reformulada, (...) cabe concluir la indefinibilidad de la verdad en su segunda acepción.Frege’s argumentation against the definability of truth aims to show that a definition of truth is circular or involves us in an infinite regress. In Frege’s work two notions of truth can be distinguished: truth expressed by the word “true” and truth conveyed by the assertion. Frege’s argumentation does not show that the word “true” is undefinable, but, if Frege’s view on assertion is accepted, then from his argumentation, suitably reformulated, the undefinability of truth in the second sense can be concluded. (shrink)

Algunas de las objeciones más importantes contra la tesis de la incommensurabilidad, especialmente en su versión referencial se basan en la teoría causal de la referencia y, en particular, en la teoría de la referencia de Putnam acerca de los términos de género natural: de estl teoría se sigue que la referencia de los términos de género natural no se ve modificada por cambios en nuestras teorías. En este articulo examino la teoria de la referencia de Putnam y arguyo que (...) esta no permite rebatir la tesis de la incommensurabilidad referencial. Mi examen se centra en la referencia de un tipo de términos de genera natural los terminos de sustancia y, en concreto, en la referencia deI término “agua”.Some of the most imporant objections against the incommensurability thesis, especially in its referential version, are based on tbe causal theory of reference and, in particular, on Putnam’s reference theory about natural kind terms; from this theory it follows that the reference of natural kind terms is not modified by changes in our theories. In this paper I examine Putnam’s theory of reference and argue that it does not countenance a refutation of the thesis of referential incommensurability. My examination concentrates on the reference of one sort of natural kind terms, substance terms, and specifically on tbe reference of the term “water”. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es examinar los contraejemplos más importantes formulados por Keith Donnellan frente a la teoría descriptiva de la referencia de los nombres propios, así como presentar una réplica a los mismos. La versión de la teoría descriptiva de la referencia que tomamos en consideración es la propuesta por Searle y Strawson, y en nuestra réplica a los contraejemplos más importantes de Donnellan hacemos hincapié en dos de los tipos de descripciones o propiedades a las que estos (...) autores apelan, a saber, las propiedades involucradas en la capacidad de reconocimiento asociada con un nombre y las descripciones parásitas. The aim of this paper is to examine the most important counterexamples put forward by Keith Donnellan against the description theory of the reference of proper names, as well as to present a reply to them. The version of the description theory of reference we take into consideration is the one proposed by Searle and Strawson, and in our reply to Donnellan's most important counterexamples we emphasize two of the sorts of descriptions or properties these authors resort to, that is, the properties involved in the capacity of recognition associated with a name and the parasitic descriptions. (shrink)

La argumentación de Frege contra la definibilidad de la verdad pretende mostrar que una definición de verdad es circular o nos involucra en un regreso al infinito. En la obra de Frege cabe distinguir dos nociones de verdad: la verdad expresada mediante el termine “verdadero” y la verdad expresada mediante la aserción. La argumentación de Frege no muestra que el términe “verdadero” sea indefinible, pero, si se acepta la concepción de Frege acerca de la aserción, de su argumentación, adecuadamente reformulada, (...) cabe concluir la indefinibilidad de la verdad en su segunda acepción.Frege’s argumentation against the definability of truth aims to show that a definition of truth is circular or involves us in an infinite regress. In Frege’s work two notions of truth can be distinguished: truth expressed by the word “true” and truth conveyed by the assertion. Frege’s argumentation does not show that the word “true” is undefinable, but, if Frege’s view on assertion is accepted, then from his argumentation, suitably reformulated, the undefinability of truth in the second sense can be concluded. (shrink)

Background: Serious games have shown positive results in increasing motivation, adherence to treatment and strengthening the therapeutic alliance in multiple psychiatric disorders. In particular, patients with impulse control disorders and other disorders in which the patient suffers from inhibitory control deficits have been shown to benefit from serious games.Aim: The aim of this study was to describe the characteristics and to evaluate the usability of a new serious videogame, e-Estesia. This serious videogame was designed to improve emotion regulation in patients (...) with gambling disorder. Preliminary results from a pilot sample are also reported.Method: A pilot sample of 26 patients undergoing treatment for GD was recruited. Participants used e-Estesia on a tablet, which was connected to a thoracic band that sent heart rate and heart rate variability data to the videogame platform in order to provide biofeedback. The System Usability Scale was completed by patients to determine the usability of e-Estesia.Results and Discussion: e-Estesia performed comparatively well for all the explored groups. Around 84.6% of the patients endorsed that it was easy to use. Female patients with GD presented higher HRV during the use of the serious videogame compared to men. (shrink)

This article is an introduction to the Synthese Special Issue, Natural Kinds: Language, Science, and Metaphysics. The issue includes new contributions to some of the main questions involved in the present philosophical debates on natural kinds and on natural kind terms. Those debates are relevant to philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and metaphysics. In philosophy of language it is highly debated what the meaning of natural kind terms is, how their reference is determined, as well as whether there are (...) differences and similarities between the semantics of natural kind terms and that of other sorts of kind terms. In philosophy of science, natural kinds are relevant because they are the basis for scientific classifications and play an explanatory role in scientific theories; thus one aim of science is to discover natural kinds and theorize about them. Natural kinds are also relevant in metaphysics, where many questions involving natural kinds are debated and especially those concerning the sort of entities we refer to when using natural kind terms, i.e., the ontological status of natural kinds; in this regard there are different views, such as conventionalism, realism and essentialism. Another metaphysical question is what it is that characterizes the naturalness of kind divisions. The introduction sketches the antecedents of some of the present views on natural kinds and natural kind terms, and indicates some of the topics dealt with in the articles that make up the issue, which can be classified in the following groups: the metaphysics and epistemology of natural kinds the semantics of natural kind terms and other kind terms questions on species and other related issues on natural kinds. However, many of the articles cover more than just one of these topics. (shrink)

The current COVID-19 crisis may have an impact on the mental health of professionals working on the frontline, especially healthcare workers due to the increase of occupational psychosocial risks, such as emotional exhaustion and secondary traumatic stress. This study explored job demands and resources during the COVID-19 crisis in predicting emotional exhaustion and STS among health professionals. The present study is a descriptive and correlational cross-sectional design, conducted in different hospitals and health centers in Spain. The sample consisted of 221 (...) health professionals with direct involvement in treating COVID-19. An online survey was created and distributed nationwide from March 20 to April 15 which assessed: sociodemographic and occupational data, fear of contagion, contact with death/suffering, lack of material and human protection resources, challenge, emotional exhaustion, and STS. Descriptive findings show high levels of workload, contact with death/suffering, lack of MHPR and challenge, and are moderately high for fear of contagion, emotional exhaustion, and STS. We found an indirect significant effect of lack of MHPR on predicting emotional exhaustion through the workload and on STS through fear of contagion, contact with death/suffering, and workload. To conclude, this study examines the immediate consequences of the crisis on health professionals' well-being in Spain, emphasizing the job demands related to COVID-19 that health professionals are facing, and the resources available in these health contexts. These findings may boost follow-up of this crisis among health professionals to prevent them from long-term consequences. (shrink)

El presente trabajo desarrolla dos grandes objetivos. Por un lado, expone sintéticamente parte de la problemática filosófica y epistemológica del sujeto y del yo, mostrando la diversidad de conceptos y de genealogías históricas, así como parte de las controversias contemporáneas, elucidando preguntas y respuestas y apostando por vías no reduccionistas o simplificadoras. Por otro lado, se pretende solventar la paradoja de René Girard entre deconstrucción y reivindicación del sujeto, a través del yo del deseo de Jean-Michel Oughourlian y del paradigma (...) de la complejidad de Edgar Morin. (shrink)

(1991). Life as emergence: The roots of a new paradigm in theoretical biology. World Futures: Vol. 32, Creative Evolution in Nature, Mind, and Society, pp. 133-149.

La obra girardiana no es sistemática. El análisis y la síntesis de contenido de sus textos es el objeto de esta investigación. Pretendemos aquí exponer y clarificar su filosofía mimética, tanto su teoría sobre la formación de los individuos, como su filosofía interdividual del sujeto, además de contextualizarla dentro del giro intersubjetivo de la filosofía contemporánea.

In a famous passage of Naming and Necessity Kripke summarizes the core of his criticism to the description theory of natural kind terms, taking into account the theory of general terms proposed by Mill, insofar as it is applied to natural kind terms, as a paradigm of that sort of theory. The aim of this paper is to argue that Mill’s generic theory on general terms does not coincide with his theory concerning the sort of general terms that natural kind (...) terms are and that the main thesis of the latter is not subject to Kripke’s objections put forward in the aforementioned passage. (shrink)

Es werden zwei Einwände Putnams gegen die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit untersucht. Pumam behauptet, nach dieser Wahrheitskonzeption seien die Äquivalenzen der Form (W) logisch notwendig oder logisch wahr, und die Wahrheit eines Satzes hänge von seiner syntaktischen Struktur und davon ab, wie die Welt ist, aber nicht von der Bedeutung des Satzes. Bei der Untersuchung dieser Einwände wird gegen Putnam geltend gemacht, daß Camaps Bestimmung einer Sprache durch semantische Regeln nicht tautologisch ist, und es werden wichtige Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede zwischen (...) der Semantik Tarskis und Camaps festgestellt. (shrink)

Es werden zwei Einwände Putnams gegen die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit untersucht. Pumam behauptet, nach dieser Wahrheitskonzeption seien die Äquivalenzen der Form (W) logisch notwendig oder logisch wahr, und die Wahrheit eines Satzes hänge von seiner syntaktischen Struktur und davon ab, wie die Welt ist, aber nicht von der Bedeutung des Satzes. Bei der Untersuchung dieser Einwände wird gegen Putnam geltend gemacht, daß Camaps Bestimmung einer Sprache durch semantische Regeln nicht tautologisch ist, und es werden wichtige Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede zwischen (...) der Semantik Tarskis und Camaps festgestellt. (shrink)

Mario Gómez-Torrente is a fundamental contribution to the issue of reference and especially of reference fixing. In this article I will focus on some questions addressed in it, especially on the relationships between some components of Kripke’s, Putnam’s and Gómez-Torrente’s theories of reference fixing as well as on the relevance of descriptions for those theories; I will then make some observations about Gómez-Torrente’s view of the reference-fixing conventions.